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10 **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**  
11 **NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**  
12 **SAN JOSE DIVISION**  
13

14 ALBERTO R. GONZALES, in his official  
capacity as ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE  
15 UNITED STATES,

16 Movant,

17 v.

18 GOOGLE INC.,

19 Respondent.

CASE NO. 5:06-mc-80006-JW

GOOGLE'S OPPOSITION TO THE  
GOVERNMENT'S MOTION TO  
COMPEL

Hearing: March 13, 2006

Time: 9:00 a.m.

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## I. INTRODUCTION

Google users trust that when they enter a search query into a Google search box, not only will they receive back the most relevant results, but that Google will keep private whatever information users communicate absent a compelling reason. The Government's demand for disclosure of untold millions of search queries submitted by Google users and for production of a million Web page addresses or "URLs" randomly selected from Google's proprietary index would undermine that trust, unnecessarily burden Google, and do nothing to further the Government's case in the underlying action.

Fortunately, the Court has multiple, independent bases to reject the Government's Motion. *First*, the Government's presentation falls woefully short of demonstrating that the requested information will lead to admissible evidence. This burden is unquestionably the Government's. Rather than meet it, the Government concedes that Google's search queries and URLs are not evidence to be used at trial at all. Instead, the Government says, the data will be "useful" to its purported expert in developing some theory to support the Government's notion that a law banning materials that are harmful to minors on the Internet will be more effective than a technology filter in eliminating it.

Google is, of course, concerned about the availability of materials harmful to minors on the Internet, but that shared concern does not render the Government's request acceptable or relevant. In truth, the data demanded tells the Government absolutely nothing about either filters or the effectiveness of laws. Nor will the data tell the Government whether a given search would return any particular URL. Nor will the URL returned, by its name alone, tell the Government whether that URL was a site that contained material harmful to minors.

But, the Government's request would tell the world much about Google's trade secrets and proprietary systems. This is the *second* independent ground upon which the Court should reject the subpoena. Google avidly protects every aspect of its search technology from disclosure, even including the total number of searches conducted on any given day. Moreover, to know whether a

1 given search would return any given URL in Google's database, a complete knowledge of how  
2 Google's search engine operates is required, inevitably further entangling Google in the underlying  
3 litigation. No assurances, no promises, and no confidentiality order, can protect Google's trade  
4 secrets from scrutiny and disclosure during the course of discovery and trial.

5 *Finally*, the Government's subpoena imposes an undue burden on Google without a  
6 sufficiently countervailing justification. Perhaps the Government can be forgiven its glib rejection  
7 of this point because it is unfamiliar with Google's system architecture. If the Government had  
8 that familiarity, it would know that its request will take over a week of engineer time to complete.  
9 But the burden is not mechanical alone; it includes legal risks as well. A real question exists as to  
10 whether the Government must follow the mandatory procedures of the Electronic  
11 Communications Privacy Act in seeking Google users' search queries. The privacy of Google  
12 users matters, and Google has promised to disclose information to the Government only as  
13 required by law. Google should not bear the burden of guessing what the law requires in regard to  
14 disclosure of search queries to the Government, or the risk of guessing wrong.

15 For all of these reasons, the Court must reject the Government's Motion.

## 16 **II. BACKGROUND**

17 Google was served with the Subpoena on or about August 25, 2005, demanding disclosure  
18 of two full months' worth of search queries entered into Google's search engine by Google's users  
19 and production of *all* URLs in Google's index that could possibly be found by a search query using  
20 Google's search engine at [www.google.com](http://www.google.com). To put this request in context, Google provides the  
21 world's most-used search engine at [www.google.com](http://www.google.com). A search engine provides the capability for  
22 users to submit text queries to find materials that may be available from an index of World Wide  
23 Web addresses or URLs collected by the search engine provider. Declaration of Matt Cutts, ¶ 6  
24 ("Cutts Decl."). Google treats the total number of, and other information about, the search queries  
25 it receives as highly confidential. Google treats its methods of searching its index and returning  
26 URLs similarly. Cutts Decl., ¶¶ 26-27.

1 By way of background, the Web is composed of billions of publicly accessible Web sites  
2 from around the world and other information sources that Web browsers can access. Each of these  
3 sites or other online documents, pages or resources, has an address known as a "URL," short for  
4 Uniform Resource Locator. URLs, technically speaking, are comprised of a protocol (e.g., http://)  
5 and an Internet Protocol address or domain name. Cutts Decl., ¶ 3. A URL name does not tell the  
6 viewer what content may be available on the Web page itself. Cutts Decl., ¶¶ 20-21.

7 Google timely objected, both in writing and in telephone discussions with the  
8 Government's counsel, as the Government acknowledges, to the over-breadth of the request, the  
9 seeming irrelevance of the data sought to the claims of the Government, the potential for  
10 compromise of Google's trade secrets, and the impact on the privacy of Google search users.  
11 Motion, *passim*. While negotiations with the Government narrowed the scope of the Subpoena,  
12 the Government apparently could not, or would not, answer Google's concerns. Declaration of  
13 Ashok Ramani, ¶¶ 3-6 ("Ramani Decl."). The Government then moved to compel Google's  
14 compliance.

### 15 III. ARGUMENT

#### 16 A. The Standard for Compelling a Third Party to Respond to a Subpoena

17 A court must quash or modify a subpoena issued to a non-party if it subjects that person to  
18 undue burden. *Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods.*, 353 F.3d 792, 813 (9th Cir. 2003). In  
19 analyzing burden, a court must balance the needs of the requesting party with the burden imposed  
20 on the non-party. *See Premium Serv. Corp. v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co.*, 511 F.2d 225 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir.  
21 1975). In performing this balancing test, a court must consider, *inter alia*, the relevance of the  
22 requested information to the claim or defenses in the underlying action. *Moon v. SCP Pool Corp.*,  
23 2005 WL 3526513, at \*4 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2005); *see DIRECTV Inc. v. Trone*, 209 F.R.D. 455,  
24 460 (C.D. Cal. 2002).

25 Unequivocally, the Government bears the burden of establishing relevance. *Echostar*  
26 *Comm'n Corp. v. News Corp. Ltd.*, 180 F.R.D. 391, 394 (D. Colo. 1998). The burden of  
27

1 establishing relevance is heavier when the disclosure would reveal the protected trade secrets of a  
2 non-party. *Id.* In such cases, the Government must show that it has a "substantial need" for the  
3 discovery which "cannot be otherwise met without undue hardship." *Id.* (internal quotations and  
4 citations omitted).

5 Even then, the status of a person as a non-party weighs heavily against disclosure. Rule 45  
6 "was intended to provide 'appropriate protection for the intellectual property of [a] non-party  
7 witness.'" *Mattel*, 353 F.3d at 814 (citations omitted). "The word 'non-party' serves as a constant  
8 reminder of the reasons for the limitations that characterize 'third-party' discovery." *Dart Indus.*  
9 *Co. v. Westwood Chem. Co.*, 649 F.2d 646, 649 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1980) (internal quotations omitted).

10 The Government, of course, has told the Court none of this. Instead, it relies on a  
11 talismanic incantation that the standard of relevance is met "so long as [the request] is reasonably  
12 calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." Motion, at 5 (citing *U. S. ex rel.*  
13 *Schwartz v. TRW, Inc.*, 211 F.R.D. 388, 392 (C.D. Cal. 2002)). Remarkably, the case the  
14 Government cites stands for exactly the opposite proposition. Rather than holding that the  
15 relevance standard is met in third party discovery cases with the mere assertion of need, *Schwartz*  
16 actually granted the motion of the third party – there, the Government itself – to withhold  
17 information on the ground of privilege if the court found the underlying information to be  
18 privileged. 211 F.R.D. at 393. The case imposed a heavy burden on the party seeking discovery  
19 from the third party to make "a strong showing of necessity" for the information. *Id.* (internal  
20 quotations and citations omitted).

21 Here the Government fails to show that the data it seeks actually will lead to anything  
22 admissible in the underlying case because the data simply is not relevant to any claim or defense.  
23 Having not crossed that initial threshold, it almost goes unsaid that they have not met the heavier  
24 burden they bear to force the disclosure of Google's confidential information. In the end, their  
25 purported need pales in comparison to the burden imposed on Google in meeting the request.  
26



1 **B. The Government Fails to Establish That the Data Will Lead to Admissible**  
2 **Evidence**

3 The Government's rationale for its Motion is two-fold:

4 (1) the production of [a week of search queries] would permit the  
5 Government to evaluate whether COPA or filtering software is more  
6 effective in restricting access to harmful-to-minor materials in response to  
7 searches as they are actually performed by present day users of the Internet  
8 (Motion, at 6); and

9 (2) the production of [randomly selected URLs] will permit the  
10 Government to review a sample set of Internet addresses available to be  
11 retrieved from the search engines operated by Google and by other entities.  
12 From that set, the Government will be able to review the sample to draw  
13 conclusions as to the prevalence of harmful-to-minor material on the  
14 portion of the Internet that is retrievable through search engines. Motion,  
15 at 8.

16 This, the Government asserts, is enough to pass Rule 45 muster and to overcome all of Google's  
17 objections to production. It is not.

18 The Government's showing is mere argument, not the required proof of the demanded  
19 data's relevance to their claim. What the Government has failed to understand or admit is that the  
20 data it seeks from Google has no conceivable use in furthering either of the Government's points.  
21 In the absence of a coherent theory of relevance, the Government's demand must be denied. *See*  
22 *Robin Singh Educ. Servs., Inc. v. Excel Test Prep*, 2004 WL 2554454, at \*2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 9,  
23 2004) (denying motion to compel since, *inter alia*, "[o]ther than the naked statement of this  
24 argument, Plaintiff does not even attempt to show how either of these two bases for relevance in  
25 fact obtain"); *Nicholas J. Murlas Living Trust v. Mobil Oil Corp.*, 1995 WL 124186, at \*5 (N.D.  
26 Ill. March 20, 1995) (denying motion to compel in part since, *inter alia*, plaintiff failed to  
27 articulate a coherent theory which would explain how the requested information was relevant).

1 We explain why the Government's theory is wrong below, supported throughout with  
2 reference to the Declaration of Matt Cutts, a Senior Engineer with Google who has direct  
3 knowledge of Google's search engine operation.<sup>1</sup>

4 **1. Search Queries**

5 The Government apparently wants to evaluate the effectiveness of filters by evaluating  
6 "searches as they are actually performed by present day users of the Internet" against a database of  
7 available URLs. Motion, at 6, 8; Declaration of Phillip Stark, ¶¶ 3-4 ("Stark Decl."). Set aside  
8 that such a theoretical comparison could be done without regard to any of Google's data, the query  
9 data requested by the Government has no easily computed correlation to how Google would  
10 generate a search result based on that same data. This is because when a user enters a search,  
11 Google runs a system of proprietary and confidential methodologies and algorithms that allow  
12 Google to crawl and index a portion of the Web, and return the most relevant search results to  
13 users. Cutts Decl., ¶ 9. These crawling, collecting, and sorting techniques are Google trade  
14 secrets. It is therefore impossible for Professor Stark to develop a test or study from the requested  
15 Google queries that would reflect realistic search results, without knowing how Google itself  
16 would produce a search result based on that query.

17 Similarly, Google users can and do modify their environment to generate certain types of  
18 search results. For example, users may employ Google's SafeSearch pornography filter to limit  
19 results. They may use Google's advanced search programs to deliver personalized or customized  
20 search results as well. Cutts Decl., ¶ 10. Therefore, the same query will generate different search  
21

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22 <sup>1</sup> The court should view the Cutts Declaration as standing in strong contrast to the  
23 Government's declarant, Professor Phillip Stark, a statistician who apparently has been hired to  
24 produce a study to support the Government's contentions. The Stark Declaration is vague,  
25 cursory, and uninformed about the operation of Google's search engine. In any event, Professor  
26 Stark's opinion ought to be viewed with some scrutiny. Although positioned as the Government's  
27 expert, he has not yet been qualified as a reliable expert by the Pennsylvania court trying the  
underlying case pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 702 or *Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms.,*  
*Inc.*, 509 U.S. 579 (1993). The Pennsylvania court has thus not yet determined whether Professor  
Stark's testimony is reliable and of any assistance to the trier of fact. *Id.*

1 results at different computers, depending on the user's preferences, again making it impossible for  
2 the Government to develop a test or study that reflects the results from a given search query.

3 Furthermore, the Government says that its requested search queries will assist it to  
4 understand "the search behavior of current web users." Stark Decl., ¶ 4. This statement is so  
5 uninformed as to be nonsensical. Search queries run on Google's databases come from such a  
6 wide variety of sources that Google's query data, stripped of personally identifying information,  
7 will not reveal whether the search query was run by a minor or adult, human or non-human, or on  
8 behalf of an individual or business. No conclusion can accurately be drawn from this data about  
9 individual behavior. Cutts Decl., ¶¶ 11 – 15.

10 Indeed, the search query data demanded by the Government would include all "real"  
11 queries entered by individual users and automatic queries generated by computer programs called  
12 "bots." Identifying and removing all bot and other non-human generated queries will be difficult –  
13 if not impossible – for most researchers. Retaining the bot inquiries, which can generate many  
14 times the number of searches as an individual, will skew any data set beyond usability and will  
15 generate search results that are meaningless if not misleading. Cutts Decl., ¶¶ 12-13.

16 In addition to bot queries, an individual may run hundreds of queries on Google, not for  
17 routine search purposes, but to check the ranking of a website or to deliberately skew Google's  
18 query log. Some Google users have actually deliberately sent pornography queries to Google in  
19 reaction to the Government's Subpoena. One striking example is that of an individual who wrote a  
20 feature for the Firefox (Mozilla) web browser that will send a random pornography query to  
21 Google whenever a user enters a query, as if the pornography query had also been entered by the  
22 user. Cutts Decl., ¶¶ 14-15, Ex. A.

23 Finally, Google's system is not static. Algorithms regularly change. The identical search  
24 query submitted today may yield a different result than the identical search conducted yesterday.  
25 In no meaningful way can it be said that a past week's worth of search queries will yield URL  
26 responses as performed by "present day users of the Internet." Motion, at 6. Past searches tell the  
27

1 Government nothing about URLs available from those searches, now or in the future. Cutts Decl.,  
2 ¶ 16.

3  
4 **2. URLs**

5 As Mr. Cutts' Declaration elaborates, there is no superficial correlation between (a) the  
6 presence of a URL in Google's index and (b) the likelihood of that URL being returned as part of a  
7 search result, or being accurately indicative of the Web page to which it links. Google only  
8 attempts to crawl the "best of the Web" to create a useful repository of Web pages. Google then  
9 implements a structure of complex systems and policies that build on each other for scoring,  
10 ranking, returning, or blocking URLs in response to queries. Cutts Decl., ¶¶ 17-19, 22. In short,  
11 unless you know *how* Google works, you cannot possibly know *what* Google will return in  
12 response to any query. Any assumption to the contrary would be inadmissible speculation.

13 In addition, the Government will not be able to ascertain the content of a Web page from  
14 its descriptive URL name. A Web site's name that suggests potential harmful material may be  
15 benign. Conversely, a URL that seems innocent may actually return pornographic material. The  
16 classic example is [www.whitehouse.com](http://www.whitehouse.com), which was a pornography site. Here, the adage "you  
17 can't judge a book by its cover" applies. A URL such as  
18 <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/prontline/shows/porn/etc/links.html> contains the word "porn" but  
19 actually provides links to anti-pornography organizations. Cutts Decl., ¶ 20.

20 Web page content also changes, or can be changed, every day or more frequently. For  
21 example, unscrupulous Web site owners will program their Web page to show innocent content to  
22 Google, in order to improve the ranking of their pages, only to swap out that content later to  
23 display pornographic material. To ensure the relevancy of its search results, Google puts  
24 significant effort into finding and removing those documents, but the process demonstrates the  
25 point that the URL itself is not indicative of what content will be displayed in response to a search.  
26 Cutts Decl., ¶ 21.



1 information and did not show a need for the broad range of information requested). If the  
2 Government shows such "substantial need" and absence of alternatives – and it cannot – the Court  
3 must balance the Government's need with the injury that would result to Google. *DIRECTV*, 209  
4 F.R.D. at 459; *Echostar*, 180 F.R.D. at 394. The balance here plainly favors Google.

5  
6 **1. The Demanded Data Contains Valuable Trade Secrets and  
Confidential Commercial Information**

7 The Government has not and cannot dispute that Google has devoted enormous amounts of  
8 time and expense to protect its valuable trade secrets and confidential commercial information.  
9 Google's query and URL data is as secret as any data in the company and must be protected.  
10 *DIRECTV*, 209 F.R.D. at 460; *see also Katz*, 984 F.2d at 424 (citing *Am. Standard Inc. v. Pfizer,*  
11 *Inc.*, 828 F.2d 734, 740 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (product formulas, product fabrication and marketing  
12 plans are trade secrets and should not be subject to discovery)).

13 The Government acknowledges that Google asserts information about search queries is a  
14 trade secret, but says Google identified no reason why it would suffer harm from compelled  
15 disclosure. Motion, at 7. But that harm is plain, because a week's worth of query data reflects a  
16 sizable number of queries. Taken together (or even in significant groupings), those queries reflect  
17 a wealth of information about aspects of Google's business that, if revealed, would injure Google's  
18 competitive position. An analysis of Google's query data would reveal proprietary information  
19 such as the number of queries that Google can or does process, its capabilities of processing  
20 certain lengths and types of queries, its market share in the United States and other countries, and  
21 even the demographics of its users. Cutts Decl., ¶ 26. Competition with Google is fierce.  
22 Google's competitors could use Google's confidential query data to manipulate their search  
23 engines to accommodate Web users and run queries similar to Google's.

24 Like queries, from even a sample of URLs that Google has indexed, one could estimate,  
25 among other things, the size of Google's index; how deeply Google crawls in different countries or  
26 languages; and the ability of Google's crawl metrics to measure the reputation of pages or

1 domains. Information about how Google crawls, or visits the different sub-pages on a website to  
2 collect the best URLs, is essential to Google's success. Google has developed its methods and  
3 technologies over many years and at considerable expense. Cutts Decl., ¶ 27. If Google's  
4 competitors were to access this information, they could conform their size and crawling metrics to  
5 Google's, thereby generating search results that mimic Google's and competing more effectively  
6 with Google.

7 Google takes extraordinary measures to protect its trade secrets and confidential  
8 commercial information.<sup>2</sup> Both Mr. Cutts and Marty Lev, Google's Director of Safety and  
9 Security, offer numerous examples in their Declarations that illustrate the measures of protection  
10 ranging from Google's facilities and computer systems to its employees. Cutts Decl., ¶¶ 29-35;  
11 Declaration of Marty Lev, *passim*. For example, Google protects its valuable trade secrets at the  
12 most basic level by not disclosing the number of computers it maintains to run its search engine,  
13 the nature of the search strings typed by users, the type of browsers its users rely upon, the mix of  
14 languages that its search engine handles, or how many queries it processes in any given day. Cutts  
15 Decl., ¶¶ 24, 26. Access to Google's internal systems, and, in particular, Google's query log and  
16 index are each restricted to a small group of trusted employees with special clearance based, in  
17 part, on the length of their employment and demonstrated need for access. Cutts Decl., ¶ 32.

18 The very fact that the Government is so uninformed about the value of search and URL  
19 information and so dismissive of Google's interest in protecting it speaks volumes about why the  
20 Court should protect Google from this compelled disclosure. The Government's cavalier attitude  
21 undermines any credibility in the assertion it later makes that it can or will protect Google against  
22

---

23  
24 <sup>2</sup> Google routinely receives and refuses requests from researchers and analysts for search  
25 query and URL data. For example, Google has denied researchers query logs to protect both its  
26 trade secrets and confidential commercial information, and to protect the privacy of its users.  
27 Cutts Decl., ¶ 35. Ironically, almost six years ago, Professor Stark obtained a small sample of  
28 URLs and queries from a particular Google engineer for what he described as a research project.  
Ramani Decl., ¶ 7. Unequivocally, it is and has been Google's policy for years not to share any  
such information with third parties. Ramani Decl., ¶ 7.

1 loss or further disclosure of the information – a promise that is hollow in the context of litigation  
2 in any event.

3 **2. Disclosure of Google's Trade Secrets Is A Significant Possibility**

4 Wide dissemination or outright disclosure of Google trade secrets is inevitable if the Court  
5 grants the Government's Motion, because Google necessarily will become entangled in the  
6 underlying litigation.

7 Disclosure to the Government, and Professor Stark, is only half the story. Once the  
8 Government tries to support its proposed theory with Google's query and URL data, the ACLU  
9 will question the theory's validity and supporting data. The ACLU has issued a subpoena to AOL  
10 apparently doing just that in regard to AOL's production in response to a similar Government  
11 subpoena. Ramani Decl., ¶ 8. This places Google – an unwilling non-party – in the witness chair,  
12 and exposes Google's intellectual property to cross-examination *in open court* by the ACLU, its  
13 counsel, experts, and consultants. No protective order can safeguard Google from the eventual  
14 eroding of the secrecy of Google's operations and of its competitive advantages as a result of the  
15 sharing of its information through or in litigation. At the very least, Google should not have to  
16 rely on a Protective Order that was signed by the parties before Google was ever issued the  
17 Subpoena.<sup>3</sup> Google neither agreed to nor negotiated the Protective Order and therefore had no  
18 control over its terms.

19 Moreover, Google has no control over whom the parties may identify as expert witnesses  
20 or consultants that, according to the Protective Order, will have access to confidential information.

21  
22  
23 <sup>3</sup> Unlike the Protective Order in *Compaq*, which prohibited access by the parties'  
24 employees, agents, and even in-house counsel, the Protective Order signed by the Government and  
25 the ACLU gives the parties' employees, witnesses, consultants and counsel access to the  
26 information and in no way protects Google's proprietary trade secrets and confidential commercial  
27 information. *See Compaq*, 163 F.R.D. at 339. Further, the Government's reliance on *Truswal Sys.*  
*Corp. v. Hydro-Air Engineering, Inc.*, 813 F.2d 1207, 1211(Fed. Cir. 1987) for the assumption that  
28 counsel will not violate the terms of a protective order is misplaced, as Google's concern reaches  
farther than mere exposure to parties' counsel.



1 For example, a party may hire a consultant with expertise on search engines who likely was or will  
2 be employed by a Google competitor. Even the Government acknowledges in the little it has  
3 disclosed about Professor Stark's study that Google's data will be viewed in "accounting for the  
4 potential of any variations in the types of queries that are entered into different search engines."<sup>4</sup>  
5 Motion, at 6. The Protective Order offers no shield at all against the array of consultants the  
6 parties can hire who will rely on and testify as to Google's trade secrets and confidential  
7 commercial information. The parties have not even yet designated their experts and consultants;  
8 therefore it is impossible for Google to know who will have access to its information.

9 Disclosure to Professor Stark is a perfect example of the significant threat of harm to  
10 Google. Professor Stark's pursuits include consulting in the private sector. Ramani Decl., Ex. A.  
11 One example that deeply concerns Google is his involvement with Cogit.com regarding targeted  
12 Web advertising. Cogit describes itself as a Web analyst that "provides insight about your  
13 customers" and "reveals facts about how they find your site, how they interact with it, and how  
14 they leave," available at <http://www.cogit.com/>. Professor Stark's involvement with Cogit and  
15 similarly situated companies may pose a serious threat to the protection of Google's trade secrets  
16 and confidential commercial information.

### 17 **3. The Government Has Not Shown a Substantial Need**

18 The Government asserts that Google's query and URL data "would be of value to the  
19 Government in its development of its overall sample of queries" because Google has the largest  
20 market share of the Web search Market. Motion, at 6. But this is no showing of "substantial  
21 need" at all. Professor Stark does not say the data is "essential," that there is no alternative to it, or  
22 that the study he proposes will not stand without it; nor does he explain why a study based on  
23

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24 <sup>4</sup> Of course, variations in search queries entered are meaningless. What matters are the  
25 URLs returned in response to a given search. As noted above, Professor Stark cannot surmise  
26 what URL will be returned without knowing how the particular search engine works. Certainly,  
27 any comparison of queries run, to be relevant, would have to use identical terms, would depend on  
28 the entity running it (e.g., bot or human), the origin of the query, and other variables that  
statistically or otherwise render the exercise one of futility. Cutts Decl., ¶¶ 8-16.

1 samples of randomly selected data must include Google's data to be valid. This is because none of  
2 these points is true.

3 Google's data cannot be essential, because the Government did not demand data from Ask  
4 Jeeves, one of the four major U.S. search engines. Professor Stark does not explain the lack of  
5 need for that data because he has not in fact disclosed how *any* data will be used in his putative  
6 study. Conversely, Google's data cannot be essential because the Government itself has narrowed  
7 its request to Google to a smaller sample. If a smaller sample is adequate from Google, and the  
8 Government hasn't asked for data from Ask Jeeves, the Government should explain why it doesn't  
9 have enough data from the search engines that already have provided millions of search queries  
10 and URL data in response to this very Government subpoena. Stark Decl., ¶ 8. There is no  
11 showing of necessity because there is no explanation of the study itself or how a sampling of data  
12 proves any fact reliably. In the absence of such a showing of necessity, the Motion should be  
13 denied. *See DIRECTV*, 209 F.R.D. at 460 (arguments not supported by specific facts or sufficient  
14 explanation of why defendants need plaintiff's proprietary information are insufficient to show  
15 need).

16 Nor can there be "substantial need" where, as Google has told the Government, and it  
17 acknowledges as much, there are better alternative sources of information. Motion, at 9. The  
18 Government concludes without explanation that those sources are "incomplete" and the "most  
19 readily available source for those materials are [sic] the operators of search engines themselves."  
20 *Id.* On the first point, the Government is simply wrong; on the second point, it chooses its own  
21 convenience over the burden it imposes on Google.

22 Mr. Cutts presents numerous examples of alternative sources for queries and URLs in his  
23 Declaration. Cutts Decl., ¶¶ 36 – 38. Google describes a few of these alternatives here.  
24 Metasearch engines Dogpile and MetaCrawler each provide services that allow anyone to view  
25 lists of queries through their search services, "SearchSpy" and "Metaspy" respectively.  
26 SearchSpy, available at: <http://www.dogpile.com/info.dogpl/searchspy/>, allows one to choose to  
27

1 view either filtered or unfiltered search queries. With a simple click of a mouse, a user may view  
2 search queries as they are run in real time. Metaspy, available at  
3 <http://www.metacrawler.com/info.metac/searchspy>, offers the same feature. Ask Jeeves' "Ask  
4 Jeeves Take A Peek" service, available at <http://www.ask.com/docs/peek/>, lists recently run  
5 queries and refreshes automatically twice a minute.

6           Regarding URLs, the data the Government claims to seek is readily and abundantly  
7 available from Alexa.com ("Alexa"). Alexa is specifically intended for "[r]esearchers who wish to  
8 tackle problems related to Web content," allowing users to process over four billion URLs and  
9 over 1.7 billion full-text documents. A researcher or developer could use this system to test  
10 software code, including pornography filters, across much more than the one million URLs sought  
11 here, and to test code over the full text of documents. Cutts Decl., ¶ 37, Ex. B.

12           The query and URL data sought by the Government is available from other sources in form  
13 and content more suited to its proposed study, for whatever value there may be in the enterprise.  
14 Whatever else that can be said, there is no necessity when similar data is available from other  
15 sources. *Compare Compaq*, 163 F.R.D. at 338 (substantial need for a portion of requested  
16 information concerning industry practice was established when information could be obtained by  
17 no source other than third party industry member) *with Am. Standard*, 828 F.2d at 743 (need not  
18 established when information was publicly available); *Travelers Indem. Co. v. Metro Life Ins. Co.*,  
19 228 F.R.D. 111, 114 (D. Conn. 2005) (granting motion to quash subpoena served on non-party  
20 since, *inter alia*, requested information was otherwise available).

21 **D. The Subpoena Imposes an Undue Burden on Google**

22           A court must quash or modify a subpoena issued to a non-party if it subjects a person to an  
23 undue burden. *Mattel*, 353 F.3d at 813; *see also Echostar*, 180 F.R.D. at 394; *Travelers Indem.*  
24 *Co. v. Metro. Life Ins. Co.*, 228 F.R.D. 111 (D. Conn. 2005). Google's non-party status weighs  
25 heavily against the Government in a burden analysis. *See Dart*, 649 F.2d at 649; *Travelers*, 228  
26 F.R.D. at 113 ("courts also give special weight to the burden on non-parties of producing  
27

1 documents to parties involved in litigation") (citing *Cusumano v. Microsoft Corp.*, 162 F.3d 708,  
2 717 (1<sup>st</sup> Cir. 1998)).

3 **1. The Time and Resources Required to Pull the Requested Information**  
4 **Would Be Significant**

5 The Government asserts that Google's burden of complying with the Subpoena is  
6 "minimal," "not complicated," and "straight-forward." Motion, at 7, 9. That other search engines  
7 have complied with the Subpoena and not reported difficulties has nothing to do with Google or  
8 its burden. Contrary to the Government's dismissive statements, the Subpoena would require  
9 significant time and resources, may hinder Google's basic operations, and may affect Google's  
10 performance.

11 First and most basically: Google does not maintain query or URL data in the ordinary  
12 course of business in the format requested by the Government. For this reason alone, the  
13 Government's Motion should be denied. *Instituform Technologies, Inc. v. CAT Contracting, Inc.*,  
14 168 F.R.D. 630, 633 (N.D. Ill. 1996) ("Rule 45 does not contemplate that a nonparty will be  
15 forced to create documents that do not exist"). Nor is there a program that could simply gather the  
16 requested data. Therefore, Google would have to create new code to format and extract the query  
17 and URL data from its many computer banks. Pulling each type of data would require multiple  
18 teams of Google engineers, diverted from their normal job responsibilities, to research, develop,  
19 write, implement, test, fix and execute new computer code. Finally, the selected data must be  
20 extracted and copied into a format that can be provided to the Government. In total, the process of  
21 gathering the queries and URLs would likely consume up to eight full-time days of engineering  
22 time. This time, of course, would have to be covered by other engineers within Google. Cutts  
23 Decl., ¶¶ 39-42.

24 Even if the Government were to pay Google for its engineers' time, executing the searches  
25 required by the Government's requests would command extended hours of processing time on  
26 Google's computers. Running these programs above and beyond the normal demand on Google's  
27

1 computers is likely to cause slowdowns, interference and even interruption of Google's normally  
2 efficient flow of operations and service, resulting in lower quality of service to users of Google's  
3 search engine and to Google's advertisers. Cutts Decl., ¶ 42.

4 While again we don't know because Professor Stark hasn't said, if it is the Government's  
5 intention to use the Google data to then run the same search queries on Google.com, this would  
6 put a further enormous and undue burden upon Google. To run the search queries would  
7 essentially add a week's worth of searches on Google.com. If the Government were to do this  
8 within a short period of time, it would put an enormous strain on Google's computer systems.  
9 Cutts Decl., ¶ 23. *See, e.g., Palumbo*, 1998 WL 436367, at \*5 (finding that, since non-party data  
10 could not be viewed in isolation, it would be unduly burdensome to ask defendants to examine  
11 additional information).

## 12 **2. The Government's Offer to Collaborate Is Inadequate and Unrealistic**

13 Suggesting that creating some multi-stage sample makes it easy on Google, the  
14 Government offers that it and Professor Stark are "willing to work with Google to specify a multi-  
15 stage sample of the queries" and URLs to reduce "any burden" on Google. Motion, at 7; Stark  
16 Decl., ¶ 3. True to form, neither the Government nor Stark proposes a method by which to specify  
17 such samples or how to determine randomness. Defining "random" could involve days or months  
18 of negotiations on how to determine selection, which could involve months of research and weeks  
19 of negotiations on a matter that is currently debated in journals and among authorities. The  
20 Government's conclusory statements of the willingness to collaborate with Google are unrealistic  
21 and in no way reduce the potential burdens on Google; it further entangles Google in the litigation,  
22 further exposes it to pre-trial deposition and cross-examination at trial, and makes it an unwilling  
23 witness and participant in the development of an expert's theory. This the law does not require nor  
24 should the Court set in motion by passing on the Government's Motion. *Premium Serv.*, 511 F.2d  
25 at 229 (plaintiff's offer to reduce burden by sifting through non-parties' documents was  
26 unrealistic).



1 Criminal Division (July 2002), *available at* [www.Cybercrime.gov/s&smanual2002.htm](http://www.Cybercrime.gov/s&smanual2002.htm). The  
2 procedures defined in ECPA for governmental access to stored electronic communications and  
3 associated transactional data are not discretionary. If search queries are covered by the statute –  
4 and there is good reason to believe they are – the Government must follow the mandatory  
5 procedures of either obtaining a court Order or giving notice to every Google user and issuing a  
6 subpoena.

7 The privacy of Google users matters and Google has promised to disclose information to  
8 the Government only as required by law or where some imminent harm is threatened. Ramani  
9 Decl., Ex. C. Google should not bear the burden and the risk of having to decide whether ECPA  
10 applies to this request.

11 Google provides a service to the public that gives users the ability to send electronic  
12 communications in the form of search queries and to receive electronic communications in the  
13 form of search results. Google users may initiate recurring searches with results sent to their  
14 Google Gmail or other email accounts at user – defined intervals. Under ECPA, any service that  
15 "provides to users thereof the ability to send or receive wire or electronic communications" is an  
16 electronic communication service ("ECS").<sup>5</sup> 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15). An ECS cannot disclose the  
17 content of such communications absent strict government compliance with the procedures outlined  
18 in Section 2703. Under those procedures, a mere subpoena for this information is not enough.

19 Further, ECPA places similar restrictions on the disclosure of stored communications to  
20 the government by providers of remote computing services. A "'remote computing service' means  
21 the provision to the public of computer storage or processing services by means of an electronic  
22

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23  
24 <sup>5</sup> Some courts have held that a mere "user" of an ECS provided by another is not itself an  
25 ECS. *See Crowley v. Cyberspace Corp.*, 166 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1270 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (holding  
26 that Amazon.com is not an ECS because it did not provide users the ability to communicate); *see*  
27 *also In re Jetblue Airways Corp. Privacy Litigation*, 379 F. Supp. 2d 299, 310 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)  
(airline reservation website is not an ECS). Google is no mere user of another's ECS of course. It  
provides the very communications capability at issue here – search – and the capability to receive  
to receive or direct receipt to oneself or others of search results.

1 communications system." 18 U.S.C. § 2711(2). An "electronic communications system" is any  
2 facility used "for the transmission of wire or electronic communications, and any computer  
3 facilities or related electronic equipment for the electronic storage of such communications." 18  
4 U.S.C. § 2510(14).

5 ECPA applies to a remote computing service if the communication that is held or  
6 maintained on that service is –

7 (A) on behalf of, and received by means of electronic transmission from (or  
8 created by means of computer processing of communications received by  
9 means of electronic transmission from), a subscriber or customer of such  
remote computing service; and

10 (B) solely for the purpose of providing storage or computer processing  
11 services to such subscriber or customer, if the provider is not authorized to  
access the contents of any such communications for purposes of providing  
any services other than storage or computer processing.

12 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(2).

13 Google users routinely store or establish repeat search queries. Google processes search  
14 requests as directed by, and for, its users who in turn retrieve the search results of their choosing  
15 from Google's index, or Google sends the results by email or text messages to individuals, to  
16 wireless phones or other designated mobile devices. Cutts Decl., ¶ 6. Said in plain language,  
17 users rely on the remote computer facilities of Google to process and store their search requests  
18 and to retrieve by electronic transmission their search results.

19 That the Government has asked Google to remove any personally identifiable information  
20 from the content of the search queries is of no moment. ECPA makes no exception for  
21 anonymous or anonymized content. Surely, the Government does not mean to suggest that it  
22 could obtain millions of emails stored in Google's servers simply by asking Google to remove the  
23 "To" and "From" lines. It matters not that it might even be helpful or relevant to the Government's  
24 case to show that email is used to send content harmful to minors. Content is off limits under  
25 ECPA except in rare cases and when procedural safeguards are followed. Google should not bear  
26



1 the burden of interpreting whether the Government is entitled to the search query results under the  
2 form of process it has issued.

3  
4 **IV. CONCLUSION**

5 The Government seeks trade secrets from Google without coming close to proving that  
6 these secrets would be relevant in the underlying litigation, that the Government faces a  
7 "substantial need" that would not impose an "undue burden" on Google, and that federal law does  
8 not blunt the disclosure. The Government's Motion must fail.

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10 Respectfully submitted,

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